indirect proof, Spinoza established the unity of substance. This curious use of equality is further illuminated by his argument that one substance cannot be the cause of another, because they both would share attributes; and this would be impossible bacause then both would be equal. 7 The hidden premise in both arguments is simply that substance cannot be equal to anything else.
This metaphysical argument is closely bound up with the cartesian conception of space as not just a matrix for measurement but as itself a sort of unlimited thing. It would be impossible -both conceptually and physically -to have two infinite spaces. Consequenfly, Spinoza's equality of measurement applies only to relations of limitations of space. This is consistent with his rejection of the real divisibility of substance, s for if an area comprised int~mite units, it (like unlimited substance) could not be equal to another. 9 2. Equality of reasoning minds -Reasoning minds are equal in two possible ways. First, all people have an inherently equal capacity for reasoning. Spinoza expressed this equality or ratiocination mythologically by the equality of creation. Second, to the extent that people are rational, they wili agree -their ideas will coincide and they will live in social harmony. 1~ However, Spinoza only referred to the equality of minds in the context of discussing their rational potential.
The rejection of election (of both individuals and nations) is central to the social ethic Spinoza developed in his political writings. And at the bottom of his project of scriptural criticism is the assumption that "the highest power of Scriptural interpretation belongs to every man . . .,,u Although this is rooted in Spinoza's conception of reason itself, he defended it polemically by reference to scripture, which declares (according to Spinoza) that God created all people with equal intellects) 2 Spinoza also adduced scriptural authority f 13 for the equality o nations.
But people and nations are equal for Spinoza only potentially. He sharply' distinguished the actual psychological constitution of persons, which is inherently unequal, from their potential. He associated equality with reason and cognition, and associated inequality with the passions and imagination. 14 Yet he characterized reasoning minds as equal only in contexts where reason is still confronted by the passions -in contexts where people are not actually equal. And he characterized minds that actually attain the highest level of rationality not as equal (nor as unequal) but as free or blessed)S His treatment of the equality of ratiocination parallels the equal-ity of measurement, where equality was restricted to proportions of f'mitude. Minds are equal in their reasoning only so long as the reasoning is potential not actual. The actual free reasoning mind, like extension, can only be self-determined. The category of equality simply does not apply. Spinoza turns to religious metaphors. 16 3, Equality of right -Spinoza characterized people in the state of nature as equals. 17 He understood the state of nature to be a real historical moment. Is Prior to the formation of the state, each person had an equal natural right to exist and act according to his or her natural conditions. But in such a state people were determined by the passions not by reason.
Moreover, for Spinoza the state of nature was marked by actual material inequality. Indeed, he explained the origin of political society as a response to this inequality, motivated by the benefits resulting from the division of labor -"for all men are not equally apt for work (aeque apti)...,,zo
Equality of right continues after the establishment of the state, for the natural fight of individuals continues after the creation of political society. 21 But this equality remains inherently limited. Within society the passions (especially vanity) oppose the natural equality of persons. 22 Spinoza described the history of the decline of the Hebrew state as the result of social inequality that resulted from the elevation of the Levites into a special caste, z3 And he designed many of the political mechanisms elaborated in the Political Treatise specifically to promote political, social and material equality and to counter the anti-egalitarian, socially dislocative forces engendered by the passions. ~ Nevertheless, though equality is in some sense an incident of good political organization, it is not, for Spinoza, the goal of politics. Rather Spinoza defined the best state in terms of conditions for freedom and reason. Within such a state people will live in harmony (concorditer). 2s He refrained from characterizing such a relationship as one of political equality (or inequality).
4. Equality of internal power of existing -Spinoza's treatment of equals in his mature writings is closely related to his theory of contingents. All individual things exist rather than not by an internal power of self-persistence or self-preservation. And all existing things are equal with respect to the internal force by which they endure .26
This internal force represents a modification of what Spinoza had termed "special divine providence" in the Short Treatise. 2v In that essay Spinoza rejected the explanation of particulars through generals and denied the existence of generals. 2s Instead he related the ultimate cause of the existence of things immediately to their comprehension by the totality (God or nature). 29 In this scheme, individuals derived existence only from participating in the totality, but the existence of the whole was itself a function of "divine providence" -the striving of all reality to persist in existence. This striving was manifest in individuals as the special divine providence.
In later writings Spinoza rejected this scheme and emphasized the source of existence as an internal power. 3~ Though in the Ethics he continued to identify the power by which individuals exist with the power of God or nature, he stressed that this power operates not as the immediate manifestation of the inf'mite power but only as that power acting through the individual's own essence .31 The internalization of this force is accompanied by its limitation to the particular existing thing. "And only after this theoritieal shift did Spinoza characterize the power by which particular individuals exist as equal.
As with Spinoza's other uses of equality, the particulars are equal in one aspect at the same time that they are most profoundly unequal in others. Individual things differ from the absolute in their transience; and they are not equal in essence, location or length of duration. Equality, again, is a function of limitation.
II. PROPERTIES OF THE COMPOUND
Equality plays an important function in Spinoza's writings in two ways. First, he draws certain inferences from the equality of sets of things and transfers them to related sets of things. Thus he extends the equality of geometric proportions to arguments about the nature of substance. Substance, as cartesian extended stuff, is ~rnilar to Euclidean space, likewise, from. the idea of equal political right rooted in a descriptive theory-of natural law, Spinoza draws specific institutional consequences. The continuity of political society with the state of nature supports this analogical transference.
Second, equality as a single type of relationship acts analogically to relate the diverse types of things that are characterized as equals throughout Spinoza's writings. In this way, the idea of equal provides thematic coherence to the system as a whole.
Geometric equality is the root analogy from which Spinoza draws immediate ontological consequences. The equality of ratiocination is the psychological complement of the equality of political fight. The equality of political right is itself a sort of subset of the equality of the internal power by which particulars exist; it is the fight of those particulars (people) who share the equality of ratiocination. The analogical square doses on itself, for the equal power by which particulars exist supports that existence of the limited parts which the equality of proportion measures in geometry, a2
There are common features to all these relations and to the overarching analogical function that equality plays in Spinoza's thought. Above all, equality relates things or ideas that are limited. But there is pervasive ambiguity regarding the source of this limitationwhether the equals are themselves objectively limited, or whether the limitation itself is a function of the heuristic process of judging them to be equals. Conceptual instability of the compound of equality stems from an ambiguity in Spinoza's root concept of geometric equality, which is never resolved. The ambiguity becomes aggravated by the extension of equality to political relations. In establishing the reality of political right, the basic analogy threatens to dissolve. But at the same time Spinoza has generated a rich category for political theory.
1. The truth of equality -Spinoza seems to imply in one passage that geometric equality is a sort of what we might call an analytic judgment a prmrL He says that the affirmation that the interior angles of a triangle equal tw~ right angles is simply a function of the idea of a triangle. Converesely, the idea of the triangle is a function of the affirmation that its three interior angels equal two right angles. He calls this affirmation the "essence" of a triangle) 3 He does not elaborate, but he seems to be saying that the judgment is immediately derivable from the definitions of line and angle that make up the triangle.
But it is clear from another passage that by "essence" Spinoza mens something other than geometric equality. For in discussing the circle, he criticizes the definition of it as a figure resulting from linesegments of equal length drawn from a central point. This definition, he says, fails to explain the circle and is really only one of its properties. Instead he defines a circle as a figure described by a linesegment one end of which is fixed and one end free. The second definition, he says, comprises the proximate cause, and all the properties of the circle can be derived from it. a4
The special status of the second definitioia is related to the fact that it describes the actual process by which a circle is drawn with a compass. But more important, it reveals the way in which Spinoza believes we cart imagine the circle. Just as he avoids talking of areas as equal and rejects the possibility of equating inf'mites, he rejects the first definition. The first definition can only generate a continuous circumference if an infinte number of lines extend from the center. But Spinoza rejects this infinite divisibility of space -into either point or line. 3s
Spinoza obviously does not consider the role of equality in the two definitions of the circle as identical. Although they relate purely geometric proportions, one is mere attribure, the other proximate cause (or essence). The attribute is derivable from the essence. But, in contrast to the definition of the triangle, the derivation is not symmetrical.
Spinoza's preference for the second dermition of the circle incorporates assumptions about the psychology of imaginative thinking. Spinoza believes that geometric figures are produced by imaginative thought in terms the imagination can depict -finite line, motion, fLxed point. The definition, like the idea, is synthetic. And, I think, turning again to Spinoza's discussion of the triangle, we can see that it, too, mirrors the process by which the imagination constructs the triangle from lines:
~\
Although the relations within each step of the retrospective analysis involve relations of equality, equality is only involved in the definition of the "essence" (a + b + c) because it is a reproduction of the original equality, as identity (k), which is posited in step one as the angle of a line (abe = k). Similarly, the equality of the radii of the circle is merely a function of the original definition of the "cause" of the circle -the single line segment is identical as it moves to create the circle. Retrospectively the distances it occupied at any moment are equal. But it is impermissible to conclude that there really are infinite radii of equal length from which the triangle is constructed. Equality is not a function of the synthetic and imaginative process by which geometric figures are formed; rather it is a judgment made retrospectively and analytically. Moreover, the conclusion I am drawn to, that equality does not correspond to the process of geometric definition, is confirmed by Spinoza's discussion in another passage of the psychology of space. He says that all objects a certain distance from the observer (about 200 feet) appear equally distant. ~ Passing over whether this is true, or what it means for psychology, the interesting fact is that Spinoza selects equality as an example of confused ideas. Equality can (in Spinoza's parlance) be false.
Spinoza characterizes the objects of geometry (quantity and measure) as modes of imagination, which result from the abstraction of substance into extension and duration, s7 It is possible to delimit and quantify this extension, once it is thinkable, but equality, too, clearly remains a product of imaginative thinking. From the higher consideration of substance by means of the intellect, substance is "infinite, indivisible and unique. ''~ The intellect -the generative source of philosophical knowledge -cannot comprehend by means of the use of equality . 39 2. The reality of equality -The status of the relationship of equality even within the imaginative or phenomenal world is ambiguous. The ambiguity stems from Spinoza's theory of relations.
In the Improvement of the Understanding Spinoza did not get past a prelimiriary classification of knowledge in terms of types of ideas and their corresponding definitions. But he did announce there the goal of ordering all ideas so that they correspond to the order of nature. And he suggested two different ways that this subjective coherence could be achieved. On the one hand, he proposed the investigation of the essence of the unitary cause of all ideas: "then our mind will to the utmost extent relect nature. ''4~ This project corresponds to the faculty of intellection. On the other hand, Spinoza insists that only by conceiving of existing objects as particulars and purging the mind of abstractions can the objects be understood clearly. 41 This corresponds to the corrective task of philosophy in purifying the imagination of false and confused ideas.
For both methods of achieving the coherence of ideas Spinoza assumes that relations within nature can be comprehended by clear ideas of objects. There is no separate need to form ideas of relations, and relations apparently have no objective correlate in nature. Thus in the Ethics Spinoza divided the world into substance, attribute and mode. Relations among ideas and objects -the ordering which was itself the philosophical task of the Ethics -falls outside of this classification. The doctrine of internal relations (which is suggested by Spinoza's treatment but never stated expressly) makes the reality of judgments of equality inherently problematic. Their truth lies only in the coherence of the thoughts compared and is a result of the process of comparison -but comparison is heuristically suspect because of the denial of reality of relations. 42 However, there is some evidence that in later years Spinoza became dissatisfied with his earlier theory of relations. In his later study of Hebrew linguistics, Spinoza established relations as a separate epistemological category alongside things, attributes and modes. 4a Relations as well as modes can be expressed with a substantive: they can be understood. Moreover, it is also only in Spinoza's last writing that he adopts the use of the substantive equality (aequalitas). 44 He uses the substantive only in the context of discussing political equality among individuals and groups or classes of individuals.
3. The instability of equality -Recognition of a substantive equality in politics threatens the analogical operation of the four equals. For substantive equality elaborated as an end of political institutions has no conceptual parallel in the root analogy of geometric equality. Indeed the hypostatization of the relationship as a substantive conflicts radically with the treatment of equality in the root analogy where the relation was ultimately dissolved as a sort of illusion wrought by imaginative thought.
The substantiation of political equality as a central feature of political theory introduces instability into the overarching analogical function of equals in Spinoza's theory. We can attempt to resolve the instability by means of biographical bifurcations of earlier and laer writings and by means of dissociating writings on political theory and metaphysics. But these external resolutions of the con-flict also serve to obscure the close genetic relation of the writings and the analogical function that the equals play even as they threaten to come apart. As I will suggest in part II, Spinoza's avoidance of the substantive is not accidental; it reflects important epistemological assumptions. However, I do not follow his usage in my discussion. This diversity of natural dispositions canplay a positive historical function because it prevents the successful manipulation of all persons by a tyrannical regime that seeks to subordinate reason by appealing to the passions. Not all people respond equally to the sarae external, authoritative incentives or threats: "brains are as diverse as palates." Theological-Political Treatise For if an infinity of points establishes the continuity of circumference, the infinitely narrow line that intersects the circumference must be still more inVmitely narrow as it approaches the center. Another way to sympathize with Spinoza's dislike of the first def'mition is to try to imagine a circle as a limit of a planar f'~ure composed of the largest inf'mity of points the total distance of which from a common point
THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW

